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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 5-4 decision,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 1 held that the U.S. Constitution—specifically the
Fourteenth Amendment—requires a State to provide a marriage license
between two people of the same sex and to also recognize a marriage
between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully
licensed and performed out-of-State. 2 Twitter registered more than 3.5
million tweets within an hour of the announcement, millions of Facebook
*

Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law and
Faculty Fellow at the Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership and
Public Policy. The author would like to thank all the contributors to the
ImmigrationProfBlog online symposium on Kerry v. Din for their unique
and thoughtful perspectives on this Supreme Court decision.
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/symposium-onkerry-v-din-.html.
1
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2
Id. at 2607–08.
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profiles were backlit with rainbows,3 and the Niagara Falls were lit with the
colors of the rainbow. This historic civil rights struggle for gay rights and
equality under the law that culminated in the Obergefell v. Hodges decision
is worthy of such celebration.
In this landmark decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
discussed the reasons and traditions on why marriage is a fundamental right
protected by the U.S. Constitution and then went on to explain how these
premises apply to same sex marriage. First, he explained that choosing
one’s spouse is inherent to individual liberty, which is why the court in
Loving v. Virginia struck down bans on interracial marriage. Second, the
right to marry is fundamental because it supports a committed union
between two individuals like no other. Third, protecting the right to marry
safeguards children and families and “is a central part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.”4 Fourth, “marriage is a keystone of
our social order.”5 In sum, marriage provides individuals the institutional
and legal capacity to affect “the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion,
sacrifice and family.”6
Yet, for Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen and refugee who fled Afghanistan
to avoid persecution, the promise of marriage remains illusory. On June 15,
2015, the U.S. Supreme Court in a plurality opinion 7 in Kerry v. Din, 8
upheld the U.S. State Department’s decision to deny her husband, Kanishka
Berashk, a visa to enter the U.S. and reunite with his wife for “terrorism
related grounds.”9 The government provided no further explanation about
3

Caitlin Dewey, More than 26 million people have changed their Facebook
picture to a rainbow flag. Here’s why that matters, WASH. POST (June 29,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2015/06/29/more-than-26-million-people-have-changed-theirfacebook-picture-to-a-rainbow-flag-heres-why-that-matters/?tid=sm_fb.
4
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail 434 U.S. 374,
384 (1974))).
5
Id. at 2601.
6
Id. at 2608.
7
There is no majority opinion in Kerry v. Din. Justice Scalia delivered the
opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Justice
Kennedy wrote a concurrence joined by Justice Alito.
8
Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
9
The U.S. State Department in a letter informed Berashak his visa had been
denied pursuant to INA § 212(a) and that there “no possibility of waiver of
this ineligibility.” Brief for Respondent at 8, Kerry v. Din, 576135 S. Ct.
2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402) (2015 WL 179409 at *8 ).
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why they viewed her husband as a national security threat. He was payroll
clerk for the Afghan Ministry of Social Welfare, which was part of the
national government that at one time, was controlled by the Taliban.
However, his occupation was not stated as a reason the consular officer in
Pakistan ultimately denied him a visa to enter the United States.10 Ms. Din
requested an explanation by the government on the reasons for why her
husband was refused a visa.
The government’s decision was an
individualized determination because it required “the application of a legal
rule to particular facts.” 11 Individualized agency determinations usually
trigger procedural due process requirements, which include a notice of
adverse action, an opportunity to present evidence and arguments before a
neutral decision maker, and a written decision explaining the reasons for the
outcome.12
The U.S. State Department refused to grant Ms. Din’s request for
review and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to recognize any protected
liberty interest for the couple to live in matrimony in United States; and
therefore procedural due process requirements were not triggered.13 As of
today, Ms. Din and her husband’s marriage is in name only, as Ms. Din
remains in this country with her mother and sister, while her husband
remains in Afghanistan.
This article contributes to the discourse14 about how rights for noncitizens to be reunited with U.S. citizen family members, are devoid of any
10

Brief of Amici Curiae Former Consular Officers in Support of
Respondent at 27, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No 13-1402) (2015
WL 294670 at *27).
11
Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2144 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
12
Id. at 2147 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion)); see also Henry Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1278–81 (1975) (compiling a list of
enumerating factors that have been considered to be elements of a fair
hearing).
13
Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2133–36.
14
See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (1990) (suggesting that current
constitutional norms defining federal immigration power are shaped by
citizenship and alienage); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (examining immigration
law as it relates to the symbiotic relationship between statutory
interpretation and constitutional law).
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constitutional guarantees, either substantively or procedurally. By
contrasting the Court’s reasoning in the cases Obergefell v. Hodges and
Kerry v. Din, this article demonstrates while the Court’s treatment of same
sex intimate relationships has evolved over time to expand constitutional
guarantees for these individuals, the Court’s thinking regarding the
absolute, unreviewable power of the executive to decide who may enter the
U.S., even to reunite with a U.S. citizen spouse, has remained harshly
stagnant. In both Obergefell and Din, the individuals were arguing their
right to marry and their right to choose where to reside in marriage were
being obstructed by unlawful government actions that violated due process
guarantees of the Constitution. Further, both parties sought similar
remedies from the Court, which was governmental recognition of their
martial union and the practical ability to effectuate such a union. The Court
in Obergefell held that the right to marry someone of the same sex is not a
question to be left to the political branches of our government, but a
constitutionally justiciable one. Yet, the Court in Din deflected the
constitutional due process claims by relying on its plenary power doctrine
jurisprudence which “has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to
the United States . . . has no constitutional rights . . . for the power to admit
or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”15 First, this article explores
some of the mechanical differences in these two cases by discussing the
legal theories of the cases. Second, the article argues that while there are
certainly technical distinctions, the more satisfying explanation for the
outcomes in these cases is that immigrant rights, unlike race, personal
reproductive choices and sexual orientation, has yet to find purchase with
the Court. Ultimately, this article concludes that non-citizens rights still
persist squarely outside the “rights-oriented jurisprudence” of the Court and
remain ensconced in the political branches’ unreviewable prerogative to
decide whom to exclude from the United States.16
I. ALL MARRIAGES ARE NOT THE SAME
The Court had the power to wield the same result on both these
cases—to affirm the right to live with the person of one’s choosing in the
State of one’s choice—and yet, the Court decided that same sex marriage
was constitutionally protected substantive right; whereas, the government’s
decision to deny a U.S. citizen and her immigrant spouse the opportunity to
reunite and live together in marriage was unreviewable by a court. This
15
16

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 11–12.
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section discusses some legal distinctions and factual differences in these
two cases.
Procedurally and substantively, these cases diverge. In Obergefell,
the petitioners successfully argued that they had constitutionally protected
substantive due process right—the right to marry someone of the same
sex—that was being trampled. They petitioned the Court to intervene and
affirmatively protect their fundamental right. Whereas, in Kerry v. Din, Ms.
Din was attempting to assert a procedural due process right, access to
information about the reasons the U.S government was denying her husband
entry into the United States. Attempting to distinguish her case from a line
of immigration cases, where the U.S. Supreme repeatedly affirmed the
power of the sovereign to exclude non-citizens and affirmed its
proclamation that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,”17 Ms. Din argued
it was her, not her husband’s, liberty interest that was implicated by the
government unsupported decision to deny her husband a visa to reunite with
her in the United States.
Ms. Din was in a “traditional” marriage.18 She was not challenging
the state or federal definition of marriage; she was not challenging the
discretionary authority bestowed by Congress to the executive to decide
who may enter the United States; she was simply challenging the opaque
decision making process void of any opportunity to confront and cross
examine witnesses, submit evidence on her husband’s behalf and refute the
government’s allegations. Ms. Din’s did not ask the Court to require the
government to admit her husband; she only requested that the Court to
require the government provide a basis for their denial. While the right
asserted by Din is much more modest than Obergefell’s, the Court refused
to extend any constitutional protection to a U.S. citizen’s claim to be
reunited with a non-citizen spouse. In sum, “the liberty interest that Ms. Din
[sought] to protect consists of her freedom to live together with her husband

17

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
A marriage as Justice Roberts notes in his Obergefell dissent was defined
by Noah Webster in his first American dictionary as “’the legal union of a
man and a woman for life,’ which severed the purposes of ‘preventing the
promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, . . .promoting domestic felicity, and .
. .securing the maintenance and education of children.’” Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (citing 1 An American Dictionary of
the English Language (1828)).
18
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in the United States. She [sought] procedural, not substantive, protection
for this freedom.”19
Another distinction between these cases is the type of permission or
legal recognition each individual sought from the government. In
Obergefell, the petitioners argued that they had a constitutional right to (1)
marry the partner of their choice and have that marriage legally recognized
by the state; and (2) to have a valid same-sex marriage that was performed
in one state to be recognized as a valid marriage in another state. The Court
had to decide if it could review a state’s decision to not issue licenses or
recognize licenses issued in other states to same sex couples. In other
words, do individuals have a constitutionally, judicially enforceable right to
have their relationship recognized and sanctioned by the issuance of a
license? In Obergefell, the Court held that marriage licenses for same sex
marriage were constitutionally required as a matter of equal protection and
due process; that states are compelled to recognize same-sex marriages
licensed by other states, and to issue licenses as well; and states cannot
through legislation define marriage to only include a union between a man
and a woman.
In Kerry v. Din, Ms. Din was challenging the government’s refusal
to issue her husband an entry visa to join Ms. Din in the United States. In
this case, the U.S. government did not challenge the validity or legality of
Ms. Din’s marriage. In fact, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
acknowledged her husband’s prima facie eligible benefit when it approved
the form I-130.20 The government in its brief to the Court conceded that
Ms. Din does have “a deeply rooted liberty interest, protected by the Due
Process Clause, in ‘rights to martial privacy and to marry and raise a
family.’”21 However, the government argued that these due process rights
“are not implicated here”22 because denying Ms. Din’s husband a visa did
not nullify the marriage or deprive Ms. Din of the legal benefits it created.23
Rather the government decided as a matter of discretion,24 not to allow an
individual to enter its border.
19

Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2142 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
Brief for Respondent at 7, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 131402) (2015 WL 179409 at *7).
21
Brief for the Petitioners at 22, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No.
13-1402) (2015 WL 6706838 at *22).
22
Id. at 22–23.
23
Id.
24
In this particular case there is even a question if true consular officer
discretion was exercised. Evidence suggests that the consular officer who
20
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Still, the idea that the Court arrived at different outcomes for these
married couples based on a formalistic distinction between the “right to
marry” and “right to live together in matrimony” is unsatisfying for two
reasons. First, the crux of James Obergefell’s claim was that he wanted to
live in a marriage with his husband John Oliver in Ohio, their permanent
residence, not in Maryland where their marriage was performed and
licensed. They could have chosen to move to Maryland and set up
residence in Maryland where there marriage was recognized, but instead
they insisted that Ohio was constitutionally required to recognize their
marriage and permit them to live as a married couple with all the rights that
flow from a legally recognized marriage including being listed as the
surviving spouse on a death certificate. The Court agreed opining that
allowing one state to refuse to recognize a marriage license issued by
another state “would maintain and promote instability and uncertainty.”25
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a fundamental right
to keep families together and that right includes an extended family.26 For
example, in Moore v. East Cleveland27, the Supreme Court invalided a city
ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single
family because the narrow definition of family violated due process. The
ordinance defined family as an individual, a husband and wife and their
unmarried children. Ms. Inez Moore was convicted of a criminal offense,
served five days in jail and ordered to pay a fine because she was living her
in East Cleveland home with her son and two grandsons, who were first
cousins, not brothers.28 The Court concluded that “[w]hether or not such a
interviewed Ms. Din’s husband was poised to grant the visa but the
automated background check ultimately resulted in a denial. The
background check is administered through the Consular Consolidated
Database (CCD), which contains more than 143 million visa application
records and data from the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS).
CLASS contains more than 42.5 million records, including 27 million
persons who are ineligible for visas. Much of the data comes from several
federal agencies including the FBI, DHS, DEA and other intelligence
agencies. Furthermore the FBI Inspector General raised concerns about the
integrity of the information stored in the database. See Brief of Amici Curie
Former Consular Officers in Support of Respondent at 11–13, Kerry v. Din,
135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No 13-1402).
25
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
26
Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977).
27
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
28
Id. at 496–97.
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household is established because of personal tragedy, the choice of relatives
in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the
State. . . .[T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its
children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined
family patterns.”29 Thus Moore affirmed that the government is prevented
from arbitrarily restricting the right of a family to live together, including
the associational right of a husband and wife to live together.30
Juxtaposed with the Court’s concern about comity between state
marriage license policies, is the Court’s apathy in Kerry v. Din the Court for
how their holding would practically impede the ability for Fauzia Din and
her husband to reside together in marriage. The U.S. government
successfully argued that its decision to deny Berashk’s visa did not prohibit
Ms. Din and her husband from living together in marriage; they were just
not allowing them to live together in the United States. The Court did not
find it legally significant that Ms. Din fled Afghanistan for fear of
persecution and was granted refugee status prior to becoming a U.S. citizen;
or that for her to return and live in Afghanistan might pose threat to her life;
or that she rebuilt her life in this country and swore allegiance to the United
States when she became a naturalized citizen; or that neither she nor her
husband had no legal right to reside in any other countries. For the Court,
the theoretical possibility that this married couple could live in matrimony
elsewhere did not threaten their fundamental right to marry. This
proposition stands in stark contrast to the Court’s position in Obergefell that
held the married couple should not have to move from on state to in order to
live together in marriage.
II. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: US VERSUS THEM
Why was the Court less concerned with protecting Din’s marital
relationship than Obergefell’s, even though her marriage was a “traditional”
one? Why did the Court insist Obergefell’s marriage license should be
portable and recognized by other jurisdictions, but fail to recognize any
right for Din to choose where to live in marriage? I would argue the biggest
difference in the Court’s willingness to extend constitutional protections to
Fauzia Din is that she is married to a non-citizen. Over time, with concerted
efforts in raising public opinion and litigating through the courts, same sex
couples are now one of us. The Court’s decision in Obergefell was the
culmination of series of Supreme Court decisions over the last three decades
29
30

Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 510–11.
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regarding the legal status of homosexuals. In Bowers v. Hardwick,31 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that criminalized
sodomy. Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,32 struck
down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would have
prohibited any city, town, or county from taking any action including
judicial action to recognize homosexuals as a protected class, as an
unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause. In 2003, the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 33 overturned Bowers v. Hardwick
holding that laws that make same sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives
of homosexual persons.”34 As recent as 2013 the Supreme Court in United
States v. Windsor 35 invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
because barred the Federal Government from recognizing same sex
marriages as valid even when they were lawful in the States they licensed.
Like the Court’s evolving jurisprudence regarding racial equality,36
the full recognition of all rights for homosexuals, materialized with
incremental decisions by the Court regarding gay rights. Indeed, Justice
Kennedy writing for the majority in Obergefell noted, “[t]he right to marry
is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from
ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our
31

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
33
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
34
Id. at 575.
35
113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
36
See e.g., Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that slaves
are not citizens in the Constitution and therefore they cannot avail
themselves of any rights and privileges found in the Constitution),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding a state statute that
limited jury service to white males who are twenty-one or older and citizens
of West Virginia was unconstitutional because it expressly “singled out”
and disadvantaged blacks); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding a Louisiana law that required railway passenger cars to have
separate but equal accommodation for “the white and colored races”),
abrogated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding
that separate education facilities are “inherently unequal” and as such are
unconstitutional); Virginia v. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a
state statute that made it a crime for persons of different races to marry
because it was unconstitutional).
32
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own era.” 37 Justice Kennedy further illuminates the relationship between
Court’s evolving jurisprudence and public sentiment. “Indeed, in
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized the new
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within
our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and
unchallenged.”38
Undeniably, the outcome, the plurality opinion, as well as the
concurrence, in Kerry v. Din is in line with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the plenary power doctrine, which has refused to overturn
or invalidate immigration statutes, holding that immigration is a matter
“vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard
to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance
of . . . government . . . exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.”39 The Court has further held that that immigration, and the
right to regulate which individuals are allowed to enter the United States, is
a power of the sovereign, thus signaling that the President has the authority
to regulate entry into the United States.40 Moreover the Court has stated,
“over no other area is the legislative power more ‘complete’ than
immigration.”41 It is Congress that enacts laws determining who can enter
the United States, under what conditions, and for how long.42 Congress also
establishes who can be removed from the United States based on acts they
commit after entry. 43 Ultimately the outcome of the Din decision is to
confirm the status quo: “aliens seeking admission [can]not challenge
immigration law on explicitly constitutional grounds.”44

37

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
Id. at 2603.
39
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952).
40
Id. at 586–88 (1952) (finding a noncitizen remaining in the United States
is a “matter of permission and tolerance;” and not a right).
41
See Adam Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration
Law, 119 YALE L. J. 458, 461 (2009) (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 766 (1972)).
42
See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 12–24 (5th ed. 2009).
43
See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 5–6 (2007) (discussing two basic types of deportation
laws: “extended border control” and “post-entry social control”).
44
Motomura, supra note 14, at 571.
38
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The plurality and concurrence in Kerry v. Din, refused to
substantively review the executive branch’s decision to exclude an
individual from entry without notice or an opportunity for rebuttal. Unlike
Obergefell whose legal claim was strategically grounded in the Court’s
evolving understanding as to the rights of individuals in same sex
relationships, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the availability of due
process for non-citizens or their spouses challenging the decision to bar
admission remains painfully stationary. The plurality argued that Ms. Din
had no constitutional right that merited judicial review. Din attempted
distinguish her cases from prior cases regarding the government’s power to
exclude by asserting that she as a U.S. citizen had a constitutional right to
know the specific reasons her husband was denied entry into the United
States when the validity of the marriage itself was not at issue. Scalia is not
persuaded and finds that there is no constitutional right to challenge a
sovereign’s decision on who to exclude even if that impacts a U.S. citizen.
Whereas, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, did not go as far to say that Ms.
Din had no liberty interest in her marriage, but rather the reason the
government provided for denying her husband’s visa was sufficient to
satisfy due process.45 In sum, the executive branch continues to possess
absolute and unreviewable authority to exclude individuals at the border
based on alleged national security grounds.46
The outcome and reasoning provided by the plurality and
concurrence in Din is reminiscent of Court’s decision over fifty years ago in
Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 47 In Knauff, the Supreme Court held that the
government’s decision to exclude Ellen Knauff, for national security
reasons without a hearing was constitutionally permissible.48 Ellen Knauff
was born in Germany in 1915, and then moved to Czechoslovakia.49 In
1939 she fled to England as a refugee. During, World War II, Ms. Knauff
served as a flight sergeant with the Royal Air Force in England and
subsequently as a civilian employee of the U.S. Army in Germany. It was
in Germany she met and married Kurt Knauff an Army veteran and fellow
civilian Army employee.50 After their marriage in Germany, she travelled
to the United States to join her husband and apply for U.S. citizenship.
When she arrived on August 14, 1948 she was immediately excluded from
45

Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139.
See Id. at 2140.
47
338 U.S. 537 (1950).
48
Id. at 544.
49
Id. at 539.
50
Id.
46
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entry and detained at Ellis Island.51 Two months later the Attorney General
ruled without a hearing the Knauff would not be allowed to enter the United
States because “her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States.” 52 She filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the
Department of Justice’s decision to deny her entry. Both the federal district
court and the court of appeals denied her habeas petition. The Supreme
Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions ruling that the Attorney General
had the power to exclude Knauff without any hearing if the decision to
exclude was for national security reasons.53 “The rule of Knauff is that the
government has absolute power to exclude. When an official claims that
the exclusion concerns the country’s national security, no court may
examine the government’s claim.”54

51

Id.
Id. at 539-40.
53
Id. at 544.
54
Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons
from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 933,
957 (1995).
52
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CONCLUSION
While there is much to celebrate in the U.S. Supreme evolving
jurisprudence to recognize constitutional guarantee to marry the person of
one’s choosing, I would argue the Court still has failed to protect marriage
where one party is a non-citizen. Ultimately, while family unity, is a central
value that informs immigration laws and policies,55 familial relationships do
not alter the political nature of U.S. immigration control policies or the
Court’s continual unwillingness to scrutinize decisions made by the political
branches of government. The decision in Kerry v. Din simply buttresses the
unchecked power of the executive to arbitrarily exclude and reaffirms that
this absolute, non-reviewable power to decide who is member of the
community of the United States and who is excluded, is an inherent power
of a sovereign nation.56 Until love wins for all, including non-citizens, the
promise of our democracy—equality and due process under the law—
remain unrealized.

55

H. Rep. No. 82-1365, at 29 (1952).
Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 9–10. Aleinikoff argues that the “current
constitutional norms defining federal immigration power are shaped by a
membership model of citizenship and alienage. The Constitution is
understood as recognizing or establishing a ‘national community,’ and one
belongs to that community by being a citizen.”
56

